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Abstract 
 
Financial liberalization in emerging-market countries has renewed questions about the 
need for deposit insurance to ensure banking-sector stability. While deposit insurance 
reduces problems of bank runs, it also reduces banks’ incentives to manage risks 
prudently, suggesting to some that eliminating deposit insurance could increase bank 
stability. Yet the wisdom of such a course depends on bank runs having no ‘self-fulfilling 
elements’ –- that is, that depositors do not rush to withdraw funds because they fear other 
depositors will, and so bring on a run. This paper examines a set of runs on Turkey’s 
Special Finance Houses, an uninsured sub-sector of Islamic banks, during the 2001 
financial crisis. We argue that, although fundamental factors were influential in initiating 
the runs, the magnitude of withdrawals from the SFHs was out of proportion with the 
risk, suggesting overreaction. We also use detailed data on withdrawals from one SFH to 
identify informational versus self-fulfilling elements at work in the run. We find evidence 
of both types of dynamics, suggesting a role for deposit insurance, judiciously used, in 
ruling out possibilities of runs.  
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This paper analyzes the dynamics of depositor behavior during a set of bank runs 
that occurred in Turkey in the first part of 2001. The runs affected Turkey’s Special 
Finance Houses (SFHs), an uninsured sub-sector of Islamic banks; because they were 
uninsured, their experiences provide valuable insights into depositor behavior in the 
absence of insurance in emerging-market countries. To our knowledge, the international 
scholarly literature has not yet included a detailed study of Islamic banking in Turkey, 
nor has it explored how Islamic banks contend with periods of macro/financial crisis that 
include bank runs.  
In February 2001, the largest finance house in Turkey became insolvent due to 
irregular use of funds and was abruptly closed. Occurring at the same time as a 
macro/financial crisis, runs on the other SFHs erupted, resulting in a sizable loss of 
deposits in the sector. We argue that, while there were valid reasons for depositors to be 
concerned about the safety of their funds, their sense of urgency about getting their 
money out of the SFHs was out of proportion with the risk, and is best interpreted as 
prompt reaction to noisy bad news that escalated into a panic. Because we have detailed 
withdrawal information from one SFH, we are also able to investigate how depositors of 
different sizes reacted to each other’s withdrawals. We find that increased withdrawals by 
moderate-size accountholders tended to boost withdrawals by smaller counterparts, 
suggesting that the latter viewed the behavior of the former as informative with respect to 
the SFH’s financial condition. Yet we also find that increased withdrawals by smaller 
accountholders tended to boost withdrawals by moderate-size accountholders, and that 
increased withdrawals by moderate-size accountholders tended to boost withdrawals by 
large accountholders -- effects that are more consistent with concerns about self-fulfilling 
elements of runs. We interpret our findings as consistent with the argument of Chen 
(1999) –- that there are both first-come, first-served and informational elements involved 
in bank runs. This suggests a role of deposit insurance, judiciously used, to rule out the 
possibility of runs.  
 
Special Finance Houses in the context of Turkish banking 
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Turkey’s Special Finance Houses (SFHs) are bank-like institutions that offer 
Shariah-compliant financial services. The Special Finance Houses are part of an 
international movement to promote Shariah-compliant financial principles; presently, 
Islamic financial institutions are estimated to manage $230 billion worldwide and operate 
in over 75 countries (1). Islamic banks make loans and take deposits in ways that respect 
the Qur’n’s prohibition against interest, based on the idea that it is inequitable and unfair 
for a lender to earn a fixed return while the borrower bears all the risk and exerts all the 
effort (2). Instead, costs of funds to borrowers and returns to lenders are based on 
mechanisms for sharing profit and loss (3). In most countries, Islamic banks constitute 
sub-sectors of national banking industries and compete with interest-oriented banks; only 
Iran, Pakistan and Sudan have banking systems that are primarily or exclusively Islamic 
(4). While Islamic banks have grown to have 10-20% shares of total deposits in countries 
such as Egypt and Kuwait, in Turkey their share has remained in a 1-3% range (5).  
First authorized to operate in Turkey in 1983, three foreign-owned finance houses 
began operations in the 1980s, and another three domestic houses entered the market in 
the 1990s (see Table 1). The SFHs can engage in all the activities of a commercial bank, 
as well as leasing and commodity trading. However, they take deposits and make loans in 
ways that do not involve payment or receipt of interest, but rather are based on risk 
participation. Their main source of funds is profit-and-loss participation accounts (6). 
Depositors invest funds for a given term (1 month, 3 months, 6 months, 1 year, and 
longer terms up to 5 years), and receive returns based on the investment projects financed 
with their funds; for each maturity, returns are calculated weekly and reported in 
newspapers. There is no guarantee of a positive return or return of principal. As such, 
profit-and-loss accounts are to some extent more like mutual funds with set maturities 
than they are like traditional bank deposits. The main use of funds by SFHs is short-term 
loans (typically 4-5 months in duration) provided to small- and medium-sized companies 
needing capital. This sort of financing, known as murabaha, represents 90% of the SFH’s 
total use of funds; as discussed in Kuran (1995: 162), the concentration of lending in this 
low-risk form implies that returns, if not guaranteed, are highly predictable (7). SFHs also 
offer financial leasing and full or partial funding for long-term business projects, known 
as mudharabah and musharakah participations respectively. The SFH keeps 20% of 
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income from lending activities and 80% is distributed to accountholders. While the SFH 
sector had been growing consistently and was viewed as a dynamic sector, as of 2000 it 
constituted a tiny sliver of the banking sector, holding less than 3% of its total deposits 
(8). 
Although the SFHs were traditionally regulated separately from commercial 
banks, the bank law of 1999 had brought them under the same regulatory requirements 
and apparatus (9). They were required to meet the same minimum capitalization as banks, 
the same required reserve ratios, and the same liquidity ratios (10). Like commercial 
banks, the SFHs must report weekly to the central bank on their foreign-currency 
position. However, the Special Finance Houses were not covered by deposit insurance, 
with the rationale that profit-and-loss accounts involved no guarantee of return of 
principal (11). Given the Turkish government’s history of extending the safety net during 
banking crises, one can ask whether the SFHs may have nonetheless expected the 
government to step in and bail them out in the event of a financial crisis (12). This seems 
unlikely, since the SFHs had variable political support and were periodically threatened 
with closure by critics in Parliament for their blending of religion and business (13).  
SFHs operations were different in several respects from those of commercial 
banks.  As Table 2 shows, SFHs tend to be squarely focused on traditional banking 
activities of deposit-taking and making loans: in 1999 deposits constituted 88% of their 
liabilities and loans were 76% of their assets, compared to figures of 62.7% and 28.3% 
respectively at commercial banks. In place of traditional lending to large businesses 
(some part of which had shifted to Turkey’s emerging capital markets), the commercial 
banks were increasingly involved in raising short-term non-deposit funds abroad and 
investing them domestically in government securities paying high interest rates. This 
practice built a fair amount of risk into banks’ balance sheets since investors would want 
to liquidate their holdings if devaluation risks rose, at the same time as lira-denominated 
securities became difficult to sell. Another difference is that the SFHs were much more 
dollarized than commercial banks: in 1999, 93% of their deposits and 86% of their loans 
were denominated in a foreign currency, compared to shares at commercial banks of 53% 
and 49% respectively. Finally, although non-performing loans were on the rise at both 
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SFHs and banks towards the end of the 1990s, at commercial banks non-performing loans 
had risen to 11.7% of total loans, versus 1.6% at the SFHs (14).   
That the financial condition of the SFHs was stronger than that of commercial 
banks is suggested by the fact that their returns to U.S. dollar accounts were lower than 
those of commercial banks (see figure 1) (15). This seems at odds with the SFHs’ lack 
coverage by deposit insurance and lack of guarantee of principal or income. However, 
while the risks taken on by commercial banks might not have concerned depositors under 
a credible program of deposit insurance, the widely acknowledged problems in Turkish 
banking raised questions about whether the government would be able to handle 
additional insolvencies through normal insurance operations. At the same time, although 
the SFHs were uninsured, some of them had close ties with strong foreign financial 
institutions that could extend credit to them in the event of short-term liquidity problems. 
That depositors were aware of this is suggested by the fact that, in 2000, the two foreign-
owned SFHs had lower rates of return on one-year U.S. dollar accounts than the 
domestically owned houses (see Table 1, column (f)) (16).   
 
Backdrop to the run: the 2000-2001 crisis 
 
As in many emerging-market banking crises, the runs on the Special Finance 
Houses occurred during in a period of macroeconomic and financial crisis. In 1999, 
Turkey had embarked on an IMF-supported stabilization program that was intended to 
bring inflation down using a crawling exchange-rate peg, while reducing fiscal 
imbalances through privatization. Doubts about whether the government could sustain the 
crawling peg created risks for banks: devaluation could be expected to prompt an outflow 
of foreign capital and a shift of TL deposits into foreign-currency assets, exacerbating 
problems with liquidity and solvency. Moreover, as part of a sweeping program to reform 
the banking sector, in late 2000 the government launched criminal investigations into the 
operations of 10 failed banks, and it was widely rumored that more charges and failures 
were to come (17). This produced a first wave of panic in November 2000 that caused 
acute liquidity problems in the banking sector; even with the central bank injecting $7 
billion in reserves to support the Lira, interbank interest rates rose to a high of 1,700 
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percent, and a good sized commercial bank failed (Demirbank). The crisis eased in 
December after an emergency loan of $10 billion was provided by the IMF (18). While 
the country’s macro/financial situation seemed to improve in early 2001, interest rates 
remained high and capital inflows remained short-term, suggesting ongoing devaluation 
fears.  
The crisis resumed in February 2001, in part sparked by an unexpected problem in 
a Special Finance house. Over the weekend of February 10, the largest Finance House, 
Ihlas Finans, had its license revoked by the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency 
(BRSA) and abruptly closed its doors. This came as a considerable shock. Ihlas Finans 
was the largest SFH, having almost 40% of the sector’s deposits in 1999. It was a 
subsidiary of the publicly-traded Ihlas Group, which has diversified holdings in 
household appliances, beverages, media and real estate and was at that time included in 
the FTSE World Index. The BRSA announced that Ihlas Finans had irregularly 
appropriated almost $1 billion (practically the entire value of deposits) through connected 
lending to shareholders (19). Shares of Ihlas Group were suspended from trading on 
Monday, driving the stock market down 4.9% that day. The 200,000 depositors of Ihlas 
Finans were reportedly ‘wandering hopelessly’ outside of the firm's branches in various 
parts of the country, unsure what had become of their deposits.  
Over the next days, the country’s macro/financial crisis returned in full force. On 
February 19, Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit and President Ahmet Necdet Sezer had a 
widely publicized clash, in which the president allegedly attacked Ecevit for not moving 
fast enough in bank reform. As anxieties returned about the viability of the stabilization 
program, the stock market tumbled and the lira came under severe pressure. On February 
22, the government abandoned the crawling peg and allowed the lira to float freely, and it 
immediately depreciated by 30%. Turkey's banks were pounded by the devaluation, 
having had a $10 billion net foreign currency short position and facing a surge in funding 
costs.  
Runs on the Special Finance Houses 
The closure of Ihlas Finans put immediate pressure on the other SFHs (20). The 
initial release of the BSRA said that, because Ihlas Finans was not a regular bank, its 
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deposits were not covered by the Deposit Insurance Fund; customers could either reach a 
deal with the parent company, or take it to court (21). Ihlas Finans initially insisted that it 
had sufficient assets to repay depositors “down to the very last kurus," and urged 
depositors to be patient (22). But as details of the case against Ihlas Finans were released, 
it became clear that it had committed substantial wrongdoing and was plainly bankrupt 
(23). 
Depositors of both Ihlas and the other Finance Houses protested that they had not 
realized their deposits were not covered by deposit insurance: many said they had 
assumed deposits were covered, or argued that they ought to be, given that the Finance 
Houses paid taxes to the government just as commercial banks did (24). There were 
numerous public pronouncements regarding the fundamental solvency of the SFH sector. 
The head of the BSRA insisted that the other Finance Houses were in good health. The 
Association of Special Finance Houses highlighted that the troubles of Ihlas Finans had 
specifically to do with its irregular and illegal use of funds, and that no such charges had 
been leveled against any of the other houses (Simsek 2001). The remaining houses took 
out newspaper advertisements emphasizing that the situation of Ihlas Finance in no way 
reflected their own circumstances. It was also stressed that the Finance Houses had 
always met their obligations, without help from the state, even in the heavy withdrawals 
of the 2000 liquidity crunch (25). 
Still, the SFH sector experienced a major run-off of deposits: as shown in Table 3 
and Figure 2, assets of all SFHs declined 63% in the first quarter of 2001; between 
December 2000 and June 2001, the assets of the 5 remaining houses fell by more than 1/3 
(26). Many depositors sought to withdraw their funds before maturity, and initially the 
SFHs accommodated such requests. But as the runs continued, some had to restrict early 
withdrawals. Some of the SFHs scrambled for emergency access to funds. It was reported 
that the Islamic Development Bank, a shareholder in Albaraka Turk and Kuwait Turkish 
Evkaf, was setting up a standby facility (although this support did not materialize). 
Kuwait Turkish Evkaf benefited from significant cash support from its foreign parent 
company, Kuwait Finance House. On Feb. 21, the special finance houses took out 
newspaper ads announcing their intention to set up a private insurance fund to cover 
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deposits, with government approval but not financial support (27). It is not clear, 
however, that these announcements had any effect in stemming the outflow of deposits.  
 
Dynamics of the run on the Kuwait Turk Evkaf Special Finance House 
 
We have daily withdrawal data from Kuwait Turk Evkaf Special Finance House 
(KTEFH) –- the third largest finance house. Established in 1988, KTEFH was (and is) 
foreign-owned: a 62% ownership share is held by the Kuwait Finance House, while 9% 
shares were held by both the Kuwait Social Security Institution and the Islamic 
Development Bank (28). This foreign connection is important since it enabled KTEFH to 
obtain support from the foreign parent during the liquidity crunch.  
Figure 3 shows the number of daily transactions from profit-and-loss accounts 
between February 12, the first business day after the closure of Ihlas had been announced, 
and April 25, when net flows into the SFH turned positive again. Withdrawals were 
heavy during the first week of the run; there was perhaps some abatement after ninth day 
of the run, when the lira had been devalued and the SFHs announced their agreement to 
set up a private insurance fund. Then the following week there was a regularly scheduled 
holiday 4-day holiday, with banks open on Friday only –- and KTEFH experienced its 
greatest number of withdrawals of the whole run.  
As can be seen from the dashed line in the figure, the time profile of withdrawals 
is almost entirely due to withdrawals of amounts less than US$5,000; such withdrawals 
accounted for 93.3% of the total number of withdrawals during the February-April 
period. While this might suggest that small accountholders were responsible for the run 
on KTEFH (and it was certainly them queuing up outside the bank), the distribution of 
amounts withdrawn suggests a different picture. As Figure 4 indicates, though small 
accountholders made over 90% of the number of withdrawals, they were responsible for 
less than 15% of the amount withdrawn. Accountholders making withdrawals of $20,000 
or more made less than 2% of the number of withdrawals, but were responsible for 62% 
of the amount withdrawn (29). The distribution of withdrawals was more or less 
proportionate to the distribution of deposits. This suggests that the withdrawals of 
relatively large accountholders contributed centrally to SFH’s liquidity problems -- not 
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because they made withdrawals disproportionate to their deposits, but rather because only 
their claims were large enough to run down cash reserves.  
What drives depositor behavior during bank runs has been a subject of debate. 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) demonstrated theoretically that, when first-come-first-
served rules are used to accommodate withdrawals, any shift in expectations that makes 
depositors anticipate a run, whether or not it conveys anything fundamental about a 
bank’s condition, can in fact lead to one. In this case, deposit insurance is beneficial for 
banking stability since bad news will no longer cause depositors to rush to withdraw, just 
because they fear that other depositors will. In contrast, Chari and Jagannathan (1988) 
argue that runs are brought on by problems of uncertainty and asymmetric information 
about banks’ financial conditions. In their portrayal, runs reflect a signal extraction 
problem in which some individuals receive a noisy signal about the bank’s return, which 
may lead them to withdraw funds early; other depositors must infer from observed 
withdrawals whether a negative signal was received by informed depositors, or whether 
liquidity needs happen to be high. Here bank runs occur because uninformed depositors 
misinterpret liquidity shocks as bad news about the condition of bank assets. But they are 
not inefficient -- bank runs can be optimal arrangements for risk sharing and should be 
allowed to happen (30). 
We use the detailed information on withdrawals from KTEFH to gain insight into 
informational vs. self-fulfilling aspects of bank runs. Our approach is based on the 
assumption that large depositors can acquire information about the bank’s condition more 
readily than small depositors: they are likely to have more skill and experience in 
collecting and interpreting financial information, and they may engage in privileged 
exchange of information with the bank. Thus, if informational aspects of runs are 
important, we would expect smaller depositors to watch the withdrawal behavior of 
larger depositors and to increase their own withdrawals when those of large depositors 
rise unexpectedly -- but not vice versa. On the other hand, if unexpected increases in the 
withdrawals of smaller depositors boost withdrawals of larger depositors, self-fulfilling 
elements are more likely to be at work, since withdrawals by small depositors are not 
informative about the bank’s condition but will signal risks that depositors are 
withdrawing because others are.  
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To investigate the influence of the withdrawals by some types of depositors on 
those of others, we estimate vector autoregressions (VARs) of withdrawals by small, 
medium and large accountholders, defined as having had accounts of under $5,000, 
$5,000-$50,000, and above $50,000 respectively (31). As discussed above, we expect the 
category of relatively large accountholders, which is dominated by business owners, to 
have better access to information about the SFH’s condition than small- and medium-
depositors: not only are their skills and experience in acquiring and interpreting financial 
information likely to be better, but also they are more likely to have privileged exchange 
information with SFH staff. Some evidence on this latter point concerns a spike on the 
20th day of the run in net withdrawals from profit-and-loss accounts by large depositors 
(see Figure 5). Curiously, there was no corresponding spike in net withdrawals from all 
accounts, suggesting that deposits into the other account category (special-current 
accounts) offset withdrawals from profit-and-loss accounts. It turns out that this was the 
case. The 20th day of the run was March 15, the last day for companies to make tax 
payments. To avoid adversely affecting their future relationships with KTEFH, large 
depositors had communicated their withdrawal needs to the SFH’s officials, who in turn 
arranged for a cash infusion from the Kuwait Finance House; this infusion, which was 
registered as a deposit, arrived on March 15 and covered the spike in liquidity needs. 
While SFH officials suspected that withdrawals by large depositors exceeded what they 
needed to make tax payments (so that the tax deadline had served an excuse for 
withdrawing funds), this pre-arrangement illustrates the likelihood that the SFH and its 
larger customers exchanged information in privileged ways.  
We estimate one VAR model based on withdrawal amounts, and another based on 
numbers of withdrawals (both expressed in logs). Our data cover the 48 business days of 
the run, starting on February 12, 2001, and ending on April 25. A vector-autoregressive 
model will not be appropriate if any of the data series included in the model contain unit 
roots. Augmented Dickey-Full tests reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in both the 
levels and numbers of withdrawals by small and large depositors at a 5% level or better.  
For medium-size depositors, we cannot strictly reject the null hypothesis for either the 
levels or numbers of withdrawals. However, the p-values are borderline at .0513 and 
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.0548 respectively, and the series do not have a characteristic non-stationary appearance. 
Consequently, we suspect this finding is spurious and treat the series as stationary.  
In the VARs for both levels and numbers of withdrawals, we include dummy 
variables for days of the week; as is apparent from Figure 3, withdrawals especially from 
smaller accounts tended to be higher on Mondays and to decline somewhat in midweek. 
Since the level of withdrawals on March 15 was extremely high, in good part due to the 
tax deadline, we include a dummy variable for this date in the VAR for levels of 
withdrawals. While inclusion of this dummy makes the model better behaved, results are 
qualitatively unaffected when it is excluded. For both VARs, most tests for lag length 
selected a length of one (32).  
We use a recursive structure to identify the model, ordering the categories of 
accountholders from small to medium to large. This amounts to assuming that, on any 
given day, the behavior of small accountholders may be observed concurrently by 
medium and large accountholders, the behavior of medium-sized accountholders may be 
observed concurrently by large but not small accountholders, and the behavior of large 
accountholders is not observed concurrently by either small or medium account holders. 
That medium and large accountholders can observe the behavior of small accountholders 
concurrently is consistent with their numerical predominance: because they represent 
over 90% of total accountholders, a large queue outside the bank must be dominated by 
them. In line with the argument made earlier, large depositors may be able to get 
information on withdrawals from moderate-size accounts through connections with bank 
staff. However, their own behavior is likely to be hard for small and medium-sized 
depositors to observe: not only are they few, but also their banking needs may be handled 
out of public view. 
Figure 6 shows impulse response functions from the VAR based on amounts of 
withdrawals. As shown in the first row, a one standard-deviation shock to withdrawals 
from small accounts significantly boosts withdrawals from such accounts, with the effect 
dwindling down over the course of the next week. Thus, small depositors appear to be 
fairly responsive to each other’s withdrawal behavior; the relatively slow rate at which 
the effect dwindles down could reflect slowness of withdrawals due to queues, time lags 
in the circulation of information, and/or time lags in decisions about what to do. A shock 
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to withdrawals from medium-size accounts also boosts withdrawals from small accounts, 
although here the effect is of only borderline significance. A shock to withdrawals from 
large accounts does not significantly affect withdrawals from small accounts, consistent 
with the idea that the behavior of large depositors is hard for other depositors to observe. 
Overall, almost all of the variance in withdrawals from small accounts is explained by 
shocks to withdrawals from small accounts.  
A shock to withdrawals from medium-size accounts also tends to boost 
withdrawals within this account category (second row). Here the effect is relatively large 
initially but tapers way down thereafter; this relatively fast reaction suggests that lags in 
information flows or decision times may be shorter among medium-size versus small 
depositors. Again a shock to withdrawals by large depositors does not significantly affect 
withdrawals of medium-size depositors. However, withdrawals from medium-size 
accounts do pick up significantly after a shock to withdrawals from small accounts, with 
the effect taking a week or so to die out; also, these effects of shocks to small accounts 
explain a sizable share of variance in withdrawals from medium-size accounts. Thus, 
medium-size depositors seem to react importantly to the withdrawal behavior of small 
depositors -– a reaction that is more consistent with concerns about self-fulfilling 
elements of runs, than with reaction to information.  
Lastly (third row), withdrawals from large accounts do not appear to be 
significantly affected by shocks to withdrawals from small accounts; this suggests that, 
unlike medium-size depositors, large depositors do not regard elevated withdrawals 
among small depositors as signaling greater potential for a self-fulfilling run. 
Withdrawals from large accounts move up a bit after a shock to withdrawals from 
medium-size accounts, though the effect is borderline in significance. In contrast, large 
depositors react strongly and immediately to a shock to withdrawals from large accounts, 
and this effect accounts for almost all of the variance in withdrawals from this category. 
Thus, while large depositors may ignore queues of small depositors outside the SFH, they 
seem keenly attuned to unexpected changes in withdrawals of depositors like themselves. 
While this is consistent with the idea that large depositors interpret elevated withdrawals 
by other large depositors as reflecting news about the SFH’s financial condition, another 
possibility is that, because a loss of large deposits itself erodes the SFH’s condition, it 
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may provoke other large depositors to withdraw their funds, regardless of what originally 
caused the increase in withdrawals.  
As an alternative specification, we also ran the VAR based on numbers of 
withdrawals. As can be seen from Figure 7, several of the results are qualitatively similar 
to those from the VAR based on withdrawal amounts. Again, within each account 
category, a shock to the number of withdrawals subsequently boosts the number of 
withdrawals in that account category; for both small and large depositors, most of the 
response occurs the next day, whereas for medium-size depositors it takes about a week 
to die out. Here again, a shock to withdrawals by small depositors tends to boost 
withdrawals from medium-size accounts, consistent with a concern among medium-size 
depositors that elevated withdrawals by small depositors may have self-fulfilling 
elements.  
In a finding that differs in the VAR based on numbers of withdrawals, 
withdrawals from medium-sized accounts tend to boost withdrawals from both small and 
large accounts, and the effect is significant in both cases; also, shocks to withdrawals 
from medium-size accounts contribute appreciably to variance in withdrawals from both 
small and large accounts, with shares of 20 to 30%. Conceivably, the effect on 
withdrawals from small accounts may be informational: Medium-size depositors may be 
better informed about the SFH’s financial condition than small depositors, and small 
depositors may be more closely connected to them than they are to large depositors, so 
that small depositors would view withdrawals from medium-size accounts as containing 
information on the SFH’s condition. At the same time, it seems unlikely that the effect of 
withdrawals from medium-size accounts on those from large accounts is informational, 
since medium-size depositors are probably not better informed about the SFH’s condition 
than large depositors. Rather, large accountholders may view withdrawals from more 
sizable accounts as having the potential to create self-fulfilling problems with solvency, 
even if the finances of the bank would otherwise be sound; thus, although they may 
ignore queues of small depositors outside the SFH, there is some evidence that they react 
to loss of deposits from more sizable accounts.  
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Discussion 
 
To what extent should we interpret the runs on Turkey’s special finance houses as 
a self-fulfilling Diamond-Dybvig reaction to random bad news, or as a fast yet justified 
response to noisy information? As found in most previous studies, informational factors 
clearly were important in triggering these runs. The sudden closure of Ihlas no doubt 
made depositors revise upward the probability of undetected financial problems in the 
other finance houses, especially given the tendency among commercial banks for 
problems turning up at one bank to turn up at others (33). Moreover, the accompanying 
macro/financial crisis would also have led to increased withdrawals, both because of 
devaluation-related concerns about liquidity and solvency within the SFHs and because, 
fearing disruptions in economic activity, depositors would have wanted to shift their 
assets into hard-currency cash. Indeed, real GDP declined sharply in 2001, and to the 
extent that people anticipated this possibility at the onset of the crisis, it would have been 
prudent for them to put aside a buffer stock of hard-currency cash to be used to support 
consumption in a period of falling income (34).  
And yet, there were also several elements of overreaction in the dynamics of the 
runs on the SFHs. First, while the failure of Ihlas surely boosted perceived risks of 
holding deposits in the SFHs, there was no reason to assume that risks of others failing 
were large or imminent: As much as depositors would have discounted official 
pronouncements on the solvency of the remaining SFHs and the apparent information 
content of their published balance sheets, it was also true that, unlike Ihlas, the other 
SFHs had come through the test of the November-December crisis without having faced 
severe liquidity problems. Thus, the better ex ante assumption would have been that none 
of the other SFHs were in as bad shape as Ihlas (35). Second, depositors initially ran on 
all of the SFHs, without apparent regard to differences in financial condition or likely 
ability to mobilize resources to withstand a run. Notable in this regard was the run on 
KTEFH, which was known to have the backing of its deep-pocketed Kuwaiti parent 
company. Ex post, the total deposits of the SFH sector not only declined but were also 
reallocated across SFHs, with KTEFH, Family Finans and Asya gaining market share and 
Anadalou and Al Baraka losing it (Table 3). However, this reallocation does not seem 
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consistent with ex ante estimations of differences in risk across institutions: based on pre-
run returns to U.S. dollar accounts (Table 1), Anadalou and Al Baraka were apparently 
not regarded as riskier than KTEFH, while Family Finans and Asya seemed to be seen as 
more so. Rather, the reallocation across houses seemed to reflect their abilities to manage 
the run on a day-by-day basis. For example, it was rumored that foreign-owned Al 
Baraka would be able to arrange a line of credit from the Islamic Development bank (one 
of its shareholders), but such financing never came through, and jitters about its liquidity 
brought its deposits down by 42% -- compared to the 22% decline experienced by 
KTEFH (36). 
Third, while the macro/financial crisis no doubt provided some impetus for 
depositors to withdraw funds, concretely there was no reason for the decline in 
macro/financial conditions to provoke large and immediate withdrawals from the SFHs. 
On one hand, unlike the commercial banks, the highly dollarized, conservatively 
managed balance sheets of the SFHs did not stand to deteriorate greatly as a result of 
devaluation: over 90% of their deposits were already in dollar-denominated accounts; 
with over 80% of their loans dollar-denominated, the currency mismatch between their 
assets and liabilities was relatively limited; and their assets were overwhelmingly 
dominated by shorter-term low-risk loans. On the other hand, while people would indeed 
have been wanting to draw down their assets to support consumption during an aggregate 
downturn, it is not clear why this would require sudden and complete withdrawals of 
funds from the SFHs; given how conservatively the balance sheets of the SFHs had been 
managed, and the limited increase in risk implied by the failure of Ihlas, it seems likely 
that depositors would have been able to withdraw funds to finance spending as needed, 
with no particular need to withdraw them immediately in full -- but for the concern that 
other depositors might well want to do the same. In other words, although the noisy 
information related to the failure of Ihlas and likely devaluation was not at all a ‘sunspot,’ 
the development of runs on the SFHs did not grow inevitably out of fundamental 
economic and financial factors -- but rather likely reflected compound risks of 
deteriorating fundamentals and depositors’ concerns about sequential servicing. Thus, 
funds flowed out of the SFH sector and into ‘mattress cash.’  
 
 17 
Conclusion  
 
In sum, while fundamental factors were clearly influential in initiating the runs on 
Turkey’s Special Finance Houses in 2001, the magnitude of withdrawals from the SFHs 
was in certain respects out of proportion with the risk, suggesting a degree of 
overreaction. From our analysis of detailed data on withdrawals from a financially strong 
SFH, we find evidence that both informational factors and self-fulfilling tendencies were 
at work in the dynamics of the run. Increased withdrawals by moderate-size 
accountholders tended to boost withdrawals by smaller counterparts, suggesting that the 
latter viewed the behavior of the former as informative with respect to the SFH’s 
financial condition. Yet we also find that increased withdrawals by smaller 
accountholders tended to boost withdrawals by moderate-size accountholders, and that 
increased withdrawals by moderate-size accountholders tended to boost withdrawals by 
large accountholders -- effects that are more consistent with concerns about self-fulfilling 
elements of runs. We interpret our findings as consistent with the argument of Chen 
(1999) –- that there are both first-come, first-serve and informational elements involved 
in bank runs. This suggests that, even if deposit insurance may be beneficially scaled 
back in emerging-market countries where coverage has been too generous, judiciously 
used, it will remain important as a mechanism for ruling out possibilities of inefficient 
runs.  
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Table 1. Turkey’s Special Finance Houses 
 
 
Abbrev. Est. Ownership Total deposits (1999) 
Return 
to 1-
year 
US$ 
account 
(2000) 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
    Amount  
(m. of 
US$) 
Share 
of 
SFH 
total 
Percent 
Al Baraka Turkish 
Finance House  ABTFH 1984 Foreign  629 23.5 6.1 
Family Finance House FFH 1984 
Initially 
foreign; 
bought out by 
Turkish 
shareholders 
in 1998 
190 7.1 6.6 
Kuwait Turkish Evkaf 
Finance House KTEFH 1988 Foreign  383 14.3 6.1 
Anadolu Finance 
House AFH 1991 Turkish 222 8.3 5.9 
Ihlas Finance House IFH 1995 Turkish 1,019 38.1 8.8 
Asya Finance House ASYAFH 1996 Turkish 233 8.7 6.6 
Total SFH  - - 2,676 100 - 
 
Sources: Rates of return: Milliyet Newspaper, 6/16/2000 [www.millyet.com.tr]. 
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Table 2. Comparison of balance sheets of commercial banks and Special Finance Houses 
 
 Commercial banks Special Finance Houses 
 1998 1999 2000 1998 1999 2000 
Composition of 
assets (percent): 
      
Liquid (ex. govt.) 18.5 18.9 20.9 12.7 15.9 18.2 
Govt. securities 14.6 17.9 11.9 
 
- - - 
Loans 36.7 28.3 31.2 75.6 76.0 71.4 
Permanent assets  8.0 9.3 15.0 8.5  7.0 7.3 
Other 22.1 25.6 21.0 2.2 1.1 3.1 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 
       
As % of total loans:       
 FX-denominated 48.6 49.1 41.5 82.7 86.4 80.9 
 Non-performing 
loans 
7.7 11.7 12.5 1.3 1.6 3.2 
 Maturity < 3 mos. Na Na Na 17.1 16.6 15.2 
       
Composition of 
liabilities (percent): 
      
Deposits 64.5 62.7 60.3 86.1 88.0 85.8 
Non-deposit funds 13.1 11.0 9.3 - - - 
Shareholders equity 8.5 8.6 10.9 5.9 5.3 5.9 
Net income 4.3 4.4 3.0 1.1 0.9 0.7 
Other 8.1 7.3 6.3 6.9 5.8 7.6 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 
       
As % of total deposit 
and non-deposit 
funds: 
      
  FX-denominated  57.0 53.1 51.9 91.5 93.3 91.9 
  Maturity  < 3 mos. 78.0 71.0 84.0 85.8 86.5 86.3 
 
Source: Banks Association of Turkey (1999, 2000).  
 
Note: The category ‘loans’ for the SFHs includes certain commodity-related transactions, 
in which SFHs place part of their liquid assets with foreign banks in special 
arrangements. E.g. Citibank-England owns stock in London Metal Exchange Market; 
SFHs buy these stocks from Citibank, then immediately sell them back on deferred 
payment terms. This enables the SFHs to earn a safe, fixed, short-term return from 
commodity buying and selling. 
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Table 3. Percent decline in deposits at the SFHs, Dec. 31, 2000, to June 30, 2001 
 
 Percent 
decline 
Al Baraka Turkish Finance House  42.1 
Family Finance House 29.4 
Kuwait Turkish Evkaf Finance 
House 22.3 
Anadolu Finance House 55.0 
Ihlas Finance House 100.0 
Asya Finance House 34.2 
Total SFH 63.0 
Total excluding Ihlas 36.4 
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Figure 1. Comparison of returns to U.S. dollar accounts, Commercial banks and Special 
Finance Houses 
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Figure 2. Levels of deposits at the Special Finance Houses, June 2000-March 2002 
 
Levels of deposits at Special Finance Houses, 
monthly data
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
06
/3
0/
20
00
08
/3
1/
20
00
10
/3
1/
20
00
12
/3
1/
20
00
02
/2
8/
20
01
04
/3
0/
20
01
06
/3
1/
20
01
08
/3
1/
20
01
10
/3
1/
20
01
12
/3
1/
20
01
02
/2
8/
20
02
M
ill
io
n
s 
o
f U
.
S.
 
$ ABTFH
KTEFH
ASYAFH
AFH
FFH
 
 
 
 22 
 
Figure 3. Number of transactions, by number of business days into the run, Kuwait 
Turkish Evkaf Finance House  
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Figure 4. Distribution of withdrawals from KTEFH, by account size 
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Figure 5. Total amount of net withdrawals from profit-and-loss accounts, by number of 
business days into the run, Kuwait Turkish Evkaf Finance House  
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Figure 6.  Impulse response functions based on amounts of withdrawals: One standard- 
     deviation innovation with 95% confidence bands 
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Figure 7.  Impulse response functions based on numbers of withdrawals: One standard-
deviation innovation with 95% confidence bands 
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End-notes 
 
(1) Figures cited in The Muslim News (2003).  
(2) For recent overviews of principles and practices of Islamic banking and finance, see 
Ahmad (1994), Iqbal (2001), Moore (2001), Zaher and Hassan (2001), and Kahf (2002). 
Note, however, that there is active discourse within the field of Islamic economics about 
what exactly the Qur’n bans; see Kuran (1989: 174, 1995: 158). 
(3) Several studies point out that profit-and-loss arrangements may entail important 
principal-agent problems: notably, the borrower has incentives to under-report income 
and over-invest in assets (see the valuable collection of studies in Iqbal and Llewellyn 
2002). Thus, not surprisingly, Islamic banks report that monitoring costs and 
misreporting of income are problems that tilt them against making loans, whereas a 
customer’s reputation, experience, and commitment to Islamic rules would tilt them in 
favor (Khalil, Rickwood and Murinde (2002). In contrast, Presley and Sessions (1994) 
argue that profit-and-loss sharing is valuable for overcoming problems of asymmetric 
information that may inhibit lending. 
(4) See Khan and Mirakhor (1990) and Cornelisse and Steffelaar (1995) on full-fledged 
Islamic banking. Note also that some major conventional banks, like HSBC and Citibank, 
have launched Islamic banking divisions that operate internationally. See Wilson 
(1999/2000) on the subject of Islamic banking in the U.K. 
(5) Moore (1990) compares experiences across countries in the growth of Islamic 
banking. 
6) Profit-and-loss accounts represent 90-95% of the value of SFHs’ deposits. The 
remaining 5-10% are "special current accounts" –- demand deposits that pay no return. 
(7) Indeed Kuran (1995: 162), among others, argues that murabaha financing does not 
effectively involve risk-sharing and so should instead be seen as a ‘cumbersome form of 
interest.’ Aggarwal and Yousef (2000) make a similar argument. 
(8) Calculated from Treasury Statistics and the Banks in Turkey report of the Banks 
Association of Turkey. 
(9) Before 1999, the SFHs had been supervised by and reported to the Treasury under-
secretariat and the Central Bank of Turkey. Errico and Farahbaksh (1998) discuss special 
issues of bank regulation relevant to Islamic banks. 
(10) In period covered by this article, the minimum capitalization was TL20 trillion; the 
capital-adequacy ratio was 8%; required reserves ratio were 8% and 11% for accounts 
denominated in Turkish Lira and foreign currencies respectively. Turkey had begun 
concerted efforts to bring its banking regulations in line with the Basel Accord, in 
anticipation of a possible application for membership in the European Union. 
(11) Also unlike commercial banks, failed SFHs would not be transferred to the Saving 
Deposit Insurance Fund for reconciliation. 
(12) Gale and Vives (2002) point out a time consistency problem in decisions to bail out 
failing banks: to reduce problems with moral hazard, ex ante a government would not 
want banks to expect to be bailed out in the event of a crisis, but ex post it may be 
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optimal for them to do so nonetheless. Consequently banks may take on too much risk, 
recognizing that the government will depart from stated policy if a crisis arises. This has 
clearly been a problem in Turkish banking: Deposit insurance was first introduced during 
the 1980s crisis, and was increased in the 1994 crisis; while the government planned to 
reduce the amount of guaranteed deposits to European Union standards, in the November 
2000 crisis the government temporarily restored its full guarantee of deposits in Turkish 
banking system. 
(13) See, for example, Turkish Probe (1998). Note, however, that the SFHs enjoyed good 
reputations and many politicians had accounts there. 
(14) This includes loans of banks that had been taken over by the Deposit Insurance 
Fund. 
(15) It is sometimes also suggested that SFH depositors are willing to accept lower 
returns to acquire financial services in ways consistent with their values, though SFH 
executives highlight the profit-orientation of their businesses, saying they aim to cater to 
consumer tastes, not religious considerations per se. See Financial Times (1998). For the 
1990-93 period, Köfteolu (1994) found conventional and Islamic banks to have virtually 
identical nominal returns, and those at the latter were not more variable than those at the 
former (cited in Kuran 1995: 161). Kuran (1995: 162) argues that this reflects the de facto 
concentration of SFHs’ assets in low-risk, mark-up trade credit. 
(16) Also note that Ihlas, the SFH that subsequently failed, was offering significantly 
higher rates 
(17) Called ‘Operation Hurricane,’ the investigations turned up many problems of 
financial irregularities, such as unsecured loans to related companies. Analysts predicted 
that another 20 or 30 of Turkey's 75 commercial banks could go under before the shake-
out was over (Boulton 1999). 
(18) Much of this loan served to replenish the $7 billion that the central bank had spent to 
support the Lira. 
(19) The irregular appropriation had until then been concealed by the rapid growth of 
deposits. 
(20) Turkish Daily News (2001e). 
(21) Newspapers reported that court cases would take 2-3 years (Turkish Daily News 
2001a). 
(22) Turkish Daily News (2001b). 
(23) It was however suggested that the parent company could use household appliances 
to compensate depositors (Turkish Daily News 2001c). A regional prosecutor got a court 
order to seize the air-conditioning systems at the parent company’s offices, as 
compensation for his 10,400 DM account (Turkish Daily News 2001d). 
(24) Turkish Daily News (2000). 
(25) Turkish Daily News (2001g). Note that the failure of these pronouncements to stem 
the runs stands in contrast to Park’s (2003) finding for the U.S., that the government or 
banks were able to stop bank panics by providing financial information on banks. 
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(26) Calculations from the Association of the SFHs; for details see Yilmaz (2003). Of 
course the February 22 devaluation lowered the U.S. dollar value of the local-currency 
deposits, but because such deposits had represented less than 10% of the sector’s total 
deposits, this contributed only minimally to the decline in value. Overall, the value of the 
sector’s deposits declined from US$ 2.7 billion in December 2000 to US$1 billion in 
June 2001, while its share of total deposits fell from 3.5% to 1.6%; these figures also 
reflect the lost deposits of Ihlas Finans. 
(27) Turkish Daily News (2001f). This provision became part of the Banks Act No. 4672 
(29 May 2001), Article 20/6-b, which stipulated that: “The Association of Special 
Finance Houses is assigned to and authorized with establishing an Assurance Fund in 
order to provide security for savings of natural persons, who have special current 
accounts and accounts for sharing profits and losses with special finance houses.” 
(28) 18 % to the General Directorate of Associations Turkey (18%), and other 
shareholders (2%). 
(29) Other studies also find small shares of depositors responsible for large shares of 
withdrawals. Schumacher (2000: 261) found that, in the first phase of the 1994-95 
banking panic in Argentina, some 2,000 accountholders with deposits exceeding $1 
million were responsible for 75% of the decrease in the total deposits of the banking 
system.. 
(30) See also Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988) and Samartin (2003). 
(31) These breaks were chosen to keep each category sufficiently large in terms of levels 
and numbers of withdrawals. Results are qualitatively similar when cut-offs are changed 
slightly. 
(32) The tests include the Schwartz and Hannan-Quinn information criteria, sequential 
modified likelihood ratio, and final prediction error. The Akaike information criterion 
selected a lag length of 9 (from a maximum of 9); models estimated using 9 lags had 
some unreasonable features, which is perhaps unsurprising since the data contain only 48 
observations. 
(33) Although authorities emphasized the problems at Ihlas were specific, the public may 
have discounted their statements based on past experiences with delays and obfuscation 
in release of financial information. Several cases had occurred in which connected 
insiders were able to withdraw funds from failing institutions before information became 
public. Indeed, the central bank president who resigned after the Feb. 22 devaluation was 
subsequently investigated for having converted his savings account from lira to U.S. 
dollars shortly before the devaluation (BBC 2001). 
(34) On the subject of relations between risky labor income and household savings and 
portfolios, see Gollier (2002). Baxter and Jermann (1997) highlight that human-capital 
risks are likely to be positively correlated with returns to domestic assets, but less 
correlated with returns to foreign assets, so that households should bias their portfolios in 
favor of foreign assets. While existing research provides little evidence of this hedging 
strategy, the reliance on foreign-currency cash as a store of value in uncertain times is 
certainly consistent with it. 
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(35) This assumption would have been confirmed ex post: despite the great pressure on 
liquidity during the runs, none of the SFHs came close to failing -– although Family 
Finans (until then named Faisal Finans) did change hands due to problems coping with 
the runs. 
(36) Other investors in Al Baraka include a family prominent in the textile industry in 
Turkey, the Dallah Albaraka Group of Saudi Arabia (a diversified global service 
company), and 200 individual shareholders from Turkey and abroad. See 
http://www.albarakaturk.com.tr. 
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